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Abstract
Deep learning has made tremendous advances in
computer vision tasks such as image classifica-
tion. However, recent studies have shown that
deep learning models are vulnerable to specif-
ically crafted adversarial inputs that are quasi-
imperceptible to humans. In this work, we pro-
pose a novel approach to defending adversarial
attacks. We employ an input processing technique
based on denoising autoencoders as a defense. It
has been shown that the input perturbations grow
and accumulate as noise in feature maps while
propagating through a convolutional neural net-
work (CNN). We exploit the noisy feature maps
by using an additional sub-network to extract im-
age feature maps and train an auto-encoder on
perceptual losses of these feature maps. This tech-
nique achieves close to state of the art results
on defending MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets, but
more importantly, shows a new way of employing
a defense that cannot be trivially trained end to
end by the attacker. Empirical results demonstrate
the effectiveness of this approach on the MNIST
and CIFAR10 datasets on simple as well as itera-
tive LP attacks. Our method can be applied as a
preprocessing technique to any off the shelf CNN.
1. Introduction
Deep learning has achieved tremendous accuracy in solving
difficult problems such as image classification (He et al.,
2016), object detection (Redmon et al., 2016), natural lan-
guage processing (Devlin et al., 2018), domain adaptation
(Sivamani, 2019) and game playing (Arulkumaran et al.,
2019). However, recent advancements in adversarial ma-
chine learning have hindered large scale deployment of deep
learning models. Szegedy et al. (2013) have shown that
carefully crafted examples can be constructed from input
images to generate incorrect outputs of high confidence.
Furthermore, such inputs can be generated to specifically
output a target class, and such an attack is known as a tar-
geted attack. The adversarial aspect of these attacks is that
the changes made to the input are small enough for a human
to not detect it. For image classification tasks, this is usually
achieved by constraint optimization of input image pixels
Figure 1. Sample adversarial images from MNIST. Adversarial
images from all 10 classes shown are classified as a 0 with greater
than 99% confidence. (10-iteration PGD)
Figure 2. Sample adversarial images from CIFAR-10. Adversarial
images from each class that are classified as a truck with greater
than 99% confidence. (10-iteration PGD)
under an LP norm to only allow a maximum perturbation
limit. Figures 1 and 2 show examples of adversarial im-
ages from the MNIST (LeCun et al., 1998) and CIFAR10
(Krizhevsky et al.) datasets from all 10 of their classes.
Several notable properties of adversarial examples have
been discovered recently that make the problem worthwhile.
Most surprisingly, it has been shown that adversarial ex-
amples can transfer from one network to another (source
to target model) (Szegedy et al., 2013). This means the
attacker does not need access to the original model to attack
it. A separate model can be trained to generate adversarial
samples, which can then be used as adversarial inputs to the
original model. These examples get stronger (lead to highly
confident incorrect predictions) as the adversary’s knowl-
edge of the target model increases. Real world examples
of adversarial attacks have been explored in (Kurakin et al.,
2016a). The authors show that adversarial images retain
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their properties after being printed physically, or recaptured
using a camera. The latter point particularly poses threat to
deep learning applications in autonomous driving, medical
imaging etc.
Current methods in adversarial defense research have two
approaches: detection and classification. Carlini and Wag-
ner (Carlini & Wagner, 2017) show that detecting adver-
sarial examples is a non-trivial task and cannot be done
efficiently at the present. In this work, we aim to accu-
rately classify adversarial samples without compromising
accuracy on clean samples. Current methods to classify ad-
versarial examples employ deep learning techniques that can
be trained end-to-end. This allows the adversary to consider
the defense as a part of the model, which can be attacked
in the same way as the original model, nullifying the effect
of the defense. Non deep learning based techniques have
yielded promising results. The adversarial perturbations are
imperceptible at the input level. However, Xie et al. (Xie
et al., 2019) show that these perturbation grow when passed
through a deep network and show up as noise on the fea-
ture maps. Motivated by this fact, we employ a denoising
autoencoder to detect and remove these noises in feature
maps.
To train the autoencoder, we use perceptual loss functions
(feature losses) (Johnson et al., 2016), previously used in
super-resolution and style transfer. These loss functions em-
ploy an additional pretrained sub-network known as the loss
network. Feature maps from various intermediate layers
from this network are extracted and compared pixel by pixel
for the input and reconstructed output of the autoencoder.
This not only ensures that the final image is clean, but that
it generates clean feature maps while passing through the
classification network. The loss sub-network does not have
to be trained for the same classification purpose. In our
experiments with the MNIST and CIFAR datasets, we use
the same loss network of VGG-16 (Simonyan & Zisserman,
2014) pretrained on the ImageNet dataset. We argue that
incorporating this additional sub-network makes it very dif-
ficult to generate adversarial examples by training it end to
end.
The main contributions of the paper are summarized below:
• We introduce a novel method to train denoising autoen-
coders.
• We create a defense strategy that cannot be trivially bro-
ken by black box attacks by training another network
end-to-end.
• We achieve 38.5% accuracy on CIFAR10 and 83.0%
MNIST using a powerful attack.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
presents relevant background and related works. Our ap-
proach is presented in Section 3 followed by extensive eval-
uation in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5.
2. Background
This work builds off of previous work in the field of adver-
sarial defenses and machine learning. This section provides
an overview of the existing related literature and the impor-
tant techniques used in this study.
2.1. Adversarial training
Adversarial training is a defense where the network is
trained on adversarial samples along with normal samples
to achieve adversarial robustness (Goodfellow et al., 2014).
It is the only defense that is universally accepted and guar-
antees improvement in accuracy. As a result, it is used as
a strong baseline for many adversarial defenses (Xie et al.,
2019). Adverserial training also addresses the trade-off in
accuracy for clean and adversarial inputs for small datasets
(LeCun et al., 1998; Krizhevsky et al.) by improving ac-
curacy on clean images, however, these results are absent
in larger datasets such as ImageNet (Deng et al., 2009). A
major challenge posed by adversarial training is that gen-
erating adversarial examples is computationally expensive.
This results in usage of the single-shot fast gradient sign
method to dynamically generate adversarial images while
training, which is significantly faster. This leads to sub-par
adversarial training and a heavy dependence on the attack.
2.2. Adversarial defenses
There is a popular class of adversarial defenses that rely
on minimizing the difference in a chosen metric calculated
for clean and adversarial samples. Adversarial logit pairing
(Kannan et al., 2018) aims to minimize the mean-squared
distance between the logits of the classification network. Xu
et al. (Xu et al., 2018) reduce the search space available
to an adversary by coalescing samples that correspond to
many different feature vectors in the original space into a
single sample. They compare the model’s prediction on
squeezed inputs of clean and adversarial samples to detect
the difference. The author’s in (Liang et al., 2018) assume
that perturbation is a form of noise and use scalar quanti-
zation and smoothing spatial filters to denoise the inputs.
Comparison with classification results of noised vs denoised
version of input detects the adversary. While these methods
achieve great results, they target specific defenses and have
been broken trivially (Carlini & Wagner, 2017).
2.3. Denoising autoencoders
Denoising autoencoders are an area of defense most rel-
evant to this work. Several recent defensive approaches
rely on input preprocessing and transformation techniques.
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Figure 3. Feature noise. The image is adapted from Xie et al.
(2019). The figure shows a clean and adversarial version of an
image and its corresponding feature maps. The perturbation is
imperceptible in the images, but clear in the feature maps.
Particularly, flavors of denoising autoencoders have yielded
promising results (Liao et al., 2018). The neural networks
mimic the process of adversarial training as a preprocess-
ing step, instead of making the network parameters robust
to adversarial inputs, a special network is trained to filter
out adversarial noise such that the original classifier can
process a clean image. Vanilla autoencoders suffer from
the error amplification effect, in which residual adversarial
noise is progressively amplified, leading to incorrect out-
put classification. Most relevant to our approach, Liao et
al. (2018) use high-level representation guided denoiser
to overcome this problem. The high-level representation
is a mean-squared loss of the output vectors of clean and
adversarial images activated by the target model. They use
a U-NET (Ronneberger et al., 2015) architecture for the
autoencoder.
2.4. Feature noise
What makes the evasion attacks adversarial is that they are
quasi-imperceptible to humans. The noise injected in the
training sample is small and hard to detect in preprocessing
stages. However, it has been shown that (Xie et al., 2019)
these noises propagate through the network and are seen as
adversarial noise on the feature maps of the target model.
Figure 3 shows an example of adversarial noise present in
feature maps generated using the Resnet-50 network (He
et al., 2016). The noise is generally constrained by the
attacker in the input images using either a matrix norm
(L2, L∞ etc.) or an upper bound to change per pixel (ε).
However, this constraint is missing on the feature maps of
the network, resulting in the aforementioned propagation.
The detection and removal of these feature noises serves as
a strong motivation of adversarial defense research.
2.5. Perceptual and feature losses
The idea of using a pretrained network to optimize multi-
ple loss function at once for another network is not novel.
Perceptual loss functions were first discovered by Johnson
et al. (Johnson et al., 2016) for image super-resolution and
style transfer. To calculate perceptual losses, a loss net-
work pretrained for image classification is used to identify
differences between content and style of an image (Gatys
et al., 2016). For neural style transfer, the pretrained loss
network is used to measure differences (mean-squared error)
between the feature maps of the content image and the style
image. The motivation behind these perceptual losses is to
gradually separate the contents and the style of an input im-
age using feature maps from a pretrained network. Feature
losses encapsulate the same concept as perceptual losses
and only differ in the use case. Convolutional kernels are ex-
tracted as feature maps of any input image from a pretrained
network and are compared using standard mean-squared
losses. Notably, the parameters of the loss sub-network
remain constant while training the autoencoder.
3. Method
3.1. Threat model
There are four possible threat models in adversarial attacks
as described by Carlini and Wagner (Carlini & Wagner,
2017):
• A zero knowledge attacker (black-box attack) that gen-
erates adversarial samples on a model and is not aware
of any defense in place.
• A perfect knowledge attacker (white-box attack) who
is aware of the model architecture and parameters and
also aware of the parameters and type of defense in
place.
• A limited knowledge attacker (grey-box attack) is
aware of the neural network architecture and parame-
ters, but unaware of the defense in place.
• A variant of the gray box attack. The attacker is aware
of the defense in place but unaware of the network
architecture and parameters.
As a threat model, we consider a realistic grey-box scenario
where the attacker has access to the model weights and
architecture but is unaware of the defense in place. This
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Figure 4. Autoencoder network architecture. The autoencoder con-
sists of 7 layers in total. The encoder uses pooling to down-scale
images. The decoder uses transposed convolution to upscale the
images. All convolutions are activated by the rectified linear unit.
assumption gives the benefit to the attacker, although it is
unlikely that the attacker has access to the model parameters.
Under this threat model, We evaluate our defense on 2 popu-
lar attacks: A one shot Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
attack and a more powerful iterative Projected Gradient
Descent (PGD).
3.2. Generating adversarial samples
Adversarial examples for both mentioned attacks are pre-
computed before training the autoencoder. The autoencoder
is trained exclusively on adversarial samples as this is em-
pirically shown to be most effective (Zhang et al., 2019).
Experiments in Section 4 show that this does not affect
accuracy on clean samples.
3.2.1. FAST GRADIENT SIGN METHOD
Goodfellow et al. first proposed the FGSM attack (Good-
fellow et al., 2014) as a fast method to optimize the input
image to convert it to an adversary. They compute gradients
only once and perform a one step optimization. The main
idea is to change every input pixel in the optimal direction (+
or -) upto a given perturbation limit (ε). If x is the original
input, then the perturbed image x∗ is calculated as follows:
x∗ = x+ ε · sign(∆xJ(x,ytrue)) (1)
This method of using the true labels for the output y leads
to the label leaking effect (Kurakin et al., 2016b) and thus
we modify the equation to use the label for the target output
class ytarget instead of the true labels:
x∗ = x+ ε · sign(∆xJ(x,ytarget)) (2)
3.2.2. PROJECTED GRADIENT DESCENT
The second attack we use is a 100 iteration version of the
projected gradient descent (PGD) (Madry et al., 2017). Pro-
jected gradient descent is an extremely powerful first order
attack as it removes any time-bound constraints on the at-
Figure 5. Feature extraction network. The VGG-16 architecture
has 16 layers as seen in here. Layers 3, 7 and 10 from the back are
used to extract feature maps FL,3, FL,7 and FL,10 of size 2×2×512,
4×4×256 and 8×8×128 respectively. FL,3 corresponds to the
feature map after the last red layer from the left before the max-
pooling, FL,7 corresponds to the feature map after the second green
layer from the left and FL,10 corresponds to the feature map after
the second purple layer from the left.
tacker. PGD is an evolution of the iterative fast gradient
sign method (IFGSM). The IGFSM attack is simply an N
iteration extension of the FGSM where the inputs pixels
are restricted to a maximum perturbation of ε by clamp-
ing the input pixel space. The optimization problem is the
following:
x∗k = clampε(x
∗
k−1 +κ · sign(∆xJ(x,ytarget))), (3)
where κ is a chosen hyper-parameter much larger or smaller
than ε . The subscript k ranges from 1 to N as and x∗k gets
more difficult to defend as the iterations proceed. PGD starts
with a random input xR near the original input space x and
performs multiple iterations of IFGSM attack to transform
xR into an adversarial example.
3.3. Preprocessing network
The preprocessing network described in this section consists
of 2 main parts: The denoising autoencoder and the loss
sub-network. The autoencoder comprises of an encoder
and a decoder. The encoder takes in an adversarial image
(28×28×1) as the input and down-scales the image into
a low dimensional space (2× 2× 8). The decoder takes
in this down-scaled decoder output and produces a clean
(denoised) image of the original dimension. Figure 4 shows
the architecture of the autoencoder used in our experiments.
The loss-sub network is used to generate feature maps for
the loss functions that govern the training of the autoencoder.
It is a pretrained image classification network using which
feature maps of images can be extracted. In this work,
we use a VGG-16 network pretrained on ImageNet. The
feature maps of clean and adversarial samples of an input
image are extracted and a linear combination of their mean-
squared errors is minimized by the autoencoder, along with
the image reconstruction loss. For this study, we use 3
feature maps from the VGG-16 network. FL,3: 3 layers
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behind the softmax layer but before the max-pooling, FL,7:
7 layers behind the softmax layer, and FL,10: 10 layer behind
the softmax. The resolution for these feature maps are
2×2×512, 4×4×256 and 8×8×128 respectively. Figure
5 shows the architecture for the VGG-16 loss network that
we use and the exact layers that from which the feature maps
are extracted.
Reducing the mean-squared error of multiple feature maps
forces the autoencoder to denoise the input image such that
the output is not only visually similar to the input, but also
generates similar feature maps on a deep network to mini-
mize the perturbations. The complete objective function for
the autoencoder is given by:
Ladv = α · (FL,3(x)−FL,3(xd))2
+β · (FL,7(x)−FL,7(xd))2
+γ · (FL,10(x)−FL,10(xd))2
+δ · (x− xd)2,
(4)
where x is the input image, xd is the corresponding denoised
adversarial sample generated, and FL,n is the function that
produces the feature map for x corresponding to the n layer
from the softmax in the VGG-16 network. The final term in
the objective is the mean-squared image reconstruction loss.
The three mean-squared errors and the reconstruction error
are linearly weighted in the objective function with use of
hyperparameters α , β , γ and δ as suggested by Johnson et
al. (Johnson et al., 2016).
4. Evaluation
4.1. Datasets
We use 2 popular datasets in the field on adversarial machine
learning research. MNIST is a database of gray-scale images
of digits 0-9. It consists of 60000 training images and 10000
testing images of 28×28×1 resolution equally distributed
among the 10 classes. CIFAR-10 is a dataset of RGB images
from 10 classes of animals (e.g., frog, bird) and vehicles
(e.g., aeroplane, truck). It consists of 50000 training images
and 10000 testing images of 32×32×3 resolution. Images
from this dataset are converted to grayscale and resized to
28×28×1 to match the input format for the neural networks
used in this work.
4.2. Implementation details
We use two networks for this work. The loss network is
a VGG-16 model pretrained on ImageNet for the image
classification task. The architecture of the network is shown
Table 1. Classification accuracies (%) for FGSM and PGD attacks
on the MNIST dataset.
ATTACK DEFENSE ACCURACY BROKEN?
FGSM UNSECURED 22.1 -
PGD UNSECURED 16.1 -
FGSM MADRY (2017) 96.4
√
PGD MADRY (2017) 92.5
√
FGSM HGD (2018) 95.9
√
PGD HGD (2018) 83.3
√
FGSM OURS 92.1 -
PGD OURS 83.0 -
in Figure 42.
The autoencoder consists of an encoder and a decoder. The
encoder takes in a 28×28×1 image as the input. It consists
of a 3× 3 convolution of 3 stride and unit padding that
goes from 1 to 16 channels followed the Relu activation
function (Nair & Hinton, 2010) and max-pooling (kernel
2 stride 2). This is followed by another 3×3 convolution
that goes from 16 to 8 channels (stride 2 unit padding).
This convolution is activated by Relu and then max-pooling
(kernel 2 stride 1). The output of the encoder is 2×2×8
which is fed to the decoder. The decoder upsamples this
encoder output via 3 successive transposed convolutions.
The first 2 transposed convolutions are followed by the Relu
activation whereas the last one is followed by the inverse
tangent function. The three transposed convolutions have
the following configurations in order: 1) kernel size 3, stride
2, no padding, from 8 to 16 channels, 2) kernel size 5, stride
3, unit padding, 16 to 8 channels, 3) kernel size 2, stride 2,
unit padding, 8 to 1 channel.
The autoencoder was trained for 100 epochs with a batch
size of 128. A learning rate of 0.001 was used and the
network was optimized using the adam optimizer (Kingma
& Ba, 2014). A weight decay of 0.00001 was used for
regularizing the network. The hyperparameters α , β , γ and
δ were chosen to be 0.00048, 0.00024, 0.00012 and 0.0013.
These values are inversely related to the number of elements
in the feature map. For e.g., α corresponds to the term
containing FL,3 in Equation 4. The function FL,3 produces
a 2×2×512 size feature map. Thus, α = 1/(2 ·2 ·512) =
0.00048. This is done so that each term in the objective
functions is weighted according to the number of elements
its feature map has.
The adversarial samples generated using FGSM use an L∞
norm with ε = 0.2. Samples generated using PGD also use
an L∞ norm with ε = 0.2. PGD was carried out for a 100
iterations with an input step size κ of 0.1. Both attacks were
carried out as untargeted attacks, i.e., a specific output class
2Training details and hyperparameters can be found on
github.com/pytorch/vision/blob/master/torchvision/models/vgg.py
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Table 2. Classification accuracies (%) for FGSM and PGD attacks
on the CIFAR-10 dataset.
ATTACK DEFENSE ACCURACY BROKEN?
FGSM UNSECURED 22.1 -
PGD UNSECURED 16.1 -
FGSM MADRY (2017) 55.5
√
PGD MADRY (2017) 47.0
√
FGSM HGD (2018) 48.9
√
PGD HGD (2018) 42.2
√
FGSM OURS 43.6 -
PGD OURS 38.5 -
was not forced.
The model that we attack is a simple 4 layer convolutional
neural network. There are 2 convolution:relu:max-pooling
layers followed by 2 fully connected layers. The first con-
volution is a 5×5 convolution with a unit stride that goes
from 1 to 20 channels. The second convolution is a 5×5
convolution with a unit stride that goes from 20 to 50 chan-
nels. The max-pooling layers are a size 2 stride 2 layer. The
first fully connected layer takes in 800 inputs (4×4×50)
and down-scales to 500 inputs. The final fully connected
layer takes these 500 inputs and down-samples to give the
10 output neurons. This baseline architecture gives 99.5%
accuracy on the MNIST dataset and 92.9% accuracy on the
CIFAR10 dataset.
4.3. Results
We perform a total of 4 experiments as outlined in previ-
ous sections: PGD on MNIST, PGD on CIFAR-10, FGSM
on MNIST, and FGSM on CIFAR10. We achieve results
comparable to Madry et al. (Madry et al., 2017) and the au-
toencoder approach by Liao et al. (Liao et al., 2018). Both
of the aforementioned defenses have been broken by slightly
modifying the objective functions given in Equations 2 and
3. The complete results for the 4 experiments have been
given in Tables 1 and 2. All experiments have been carried
out using the methodology detailed in 4.2.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed an alternative approach
and objective function to train denoising autoencoders as
an adversarial defense. The novel objective functions are
motivated by the fact that although adversarial perturbations
are imperceptible at the input level, they grow and propogate
forward in a feed-forward or a deep convolutional network
and show up as noise in the feature maps generated by the ad-
versarial samples on the given network. Using an additional
pretrained loss network makes it non-trivial for attackers
to break it using trivial backpropagation. Several design
choices made in this study are open for future works and
may lead to potential improvements, such as: architecture
of the autoencoder, choice of the loss sub-network and its
effect on accuracy, choice of feature maps within the loss
sub-network etc. Evaluations are conducted on grey-box
scenarios using FGSM, and a powerful 100 iteration PGD.
The results achieved show promising initial results on two
popular datasets MNIST and CIFAR-10, suggesting that
this approach could lead to a viable long term solution in
the field of adversarial defense research.
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